UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/116
15 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1040 (1996) of 29 January 1996, in which I was requested to keep the Council closely informed, including on the technical security mission that I had sent to Burundi, and to submit a full report to the Council by 20 February on the situation, covering the progress of my efforts to facilitate a comprehensive political dialogue. I was also requested, in consultation as appropriate with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and with Member States concerned, to consider what further steps of a preventive nature might be necessary in order to avoid a further deterioration of the situation, to develop contingency plans as appropriate and to include them in my report to the Council.

2. The present report follows a series of oral reports to the Council by my Personal Representative. On 22 January, I myself reported to the Council on the situation in Burundi. I also addressed two letters to the President of the Council on 29 December 1995 (S/1995/1068) and 16 January 1996 (S/1996/36).

II. POLITICAL SITUATION

3. In all of these communications and briefings, I underlined the seriousness of the political and security situation in Burundi, which is defined by visceral fears and brutal struggles for power. Much of the Tutsi minority, historically dominant, lives with the phobia of its physical elimination, while the Hutu majority demands proper political representation. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda has heightened the fears of the minority, leading extremist elements to undertake ruthless actions against Hutu populations. Hutu extremists, in turn, are reinforced and supported from outside the country by some of the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide. In such an environment, the voices of moderation are being drowned out, silenced or eliminated altogether.

4. December 1995 was characterized by widespread violence and by attempts by members of the opposition, with support from among the military, to remove from office the President of Burundi, Mr. Sylvestre Ntibantunganya. On 12 December,

the General Director of Burundi's National Institute of Social Security, a member of the majority party, the front pour la démocracie au Burundi (FRODEBU), and his son were killed when unidentified assailants tossed a grenade inside their car. On 19 and 20 December, security forces allegedly killed a Hutu member of Parliament, and two other Hutu politicians were murdered in separate incidents. Around the same time, 27 people died in clashes between the military and insurgents in the Murwi and Buganda communes, while over 30 were killed near Bujumbura. On 22 December, the Governor of the northern Ngozi province was assassinated. Violence was also directed against members of the international humanitarian community, leading me to dispatch the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Ogata, as my Special Envoy, to the country (see sect. IV below).

5. As regards the attempts to depose the President, differences on how to achieve this objective helped to prevent the crisis from worsening: while some preferred a constitutional approach to remove him, others favoured an outright overthrow. The opposition had hoped that the Framework for Concerted Action, established on 13 November 1995 in accordance with the convention on governance (S/1995/190, annex), would provide the forum to accelerate the removal of the President. That mechanism was supposed to start its work on 26 December 1995; it was feared that discussions in the context of the Framework would be used to demonstrate that both the President and the Prime Minister, Mr. Antoine Nduwayo, had failed to implement the Convention, thereby justifying their removal. However, FRODEBU refused to participate in the Framework meetings in protest against the recent assassinations and harassment of some of their officials.

6. At the beginning of January 1996, my Special Representative, Mr. Marc Faguy, confirmed that the influence of moderate political forces in Burundi continued to diminish. In his New Year's address, the President called upon institutions, State services and organizations to work together to overcome the phenomena of fear, violence and uncertainty. For his part, the Prime Minister publicly warned that the ideology of exclusion and genocide was gaining ground.

7. The situation was exacerbated when Tutsi extremists called a "dead city" operation, which started in Bujumbura on 15 January 1996. Three days earlier, a number of civil groups and associations under the influence of political parties not represented in the National Assembly had called on the population to stop working until the President left office. Their attempts to involve the minority party, the Union pour le progrès national (UPRONA), in the "dead city" operation did not materialize as expected, thanks in large measure to the strong intervention of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence. Intimidation, however, continued despite the fact that some of the extremist leaders were put under house arrest or detained. On 16 January, the military introduced countermeasures to contain the demonstrations.

8. While the situation in Bujumbura has now returned to a state of uneasy peace, security conditions in the countryside remain volatile. Armed Hutu groups have concentrated their actions against strategic targets, sometimes with dire consequences for the population. A recent attack on electrical power pylons near Bujumbura, for example, seriously affected the water supply to the city. Heavy fighting has been reported in northern areas of Burundi, uprooting

once more tens of thousands of people and increasing the burden on both humanitarian organizations and the neighbouring countries.

9. In recent days, however, the situation in Burundi has been somewhat calmer. The Government is currently engaged in its third campaign for the return of peace, the intensification of which could augur well for the future. The efforts of the international community, including my Special Representative, and the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 1040 (1996) have helped to reduce tensions and encourage dialogue. In addition, the welcome recent improvement of coordination between the President and the Prime Minister should stimulate other activities that will contribute to the promotion of peace. It should also convey the message to the extremists that most people in Burundi have had enough of violence and feel it is time for them to participate in the long-awaited national debate. These relatively positive signs should not, however, be taken to mean that a solution is imminent or that the international community can afford to relax its efforts to avert catastrophe.

III. PROMOTING DIALOGUE

10. As I informed the Council in my letter to the President dated 16 January 1996 (S/1996/36), it is unrealistic to expect a handful of small-scale measures to have any real impact on the fundamental problems of Burundi. That was why I continued to believe that the international community needed to launch a major initiative to prevent another humanitarian tragedy in the subregion, as well as to promote a dialogue embracing all the elements of the Burundian political spectrum. I therefore instructed my Special Representative to explore urgently with Burundian leaders how such a dialogue might be established, possibly under United Nations auspices. He has maintained intense efforts to this end but has not yet been able to report substantial progress.

11. Members of the Council are aware that, on 19 January 1996, I met the former President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mr. Julius K. Nyerere, who had visited Burundi at the end of 1995. Mr. Nyerere feared that the Government in Burundi could collapse and agreed with me that a major initiative was urgently needed. He was in favour of a broad-based dialogue that should include even extremists from both sides of the political spectrum in Burundi. He requested the support of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and underlined the importance of the international community's active support for such an initiative.

12. I have since been pleased to learn from Mr. Nyerere that he has continued his talks with leaders in Burundi. During his most recent visit to the country, earlier this month, he tried to arrange a broad-based dialogue embracing all political factions. However, this proposal was not found acceptable by some of the leaders.

13. I understand that Mr. Nyerere intends to continue his efforts, as will my Special Representative. Should they report any significant progress, we shall all, of course, welcome it, and I shall immediately inform the Security Council.

IV. THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

14. In the light of the political and security situation outlined above, it is not surprising that the humanitarian situation in Burundi has deteriorated. The last two and a half years of political instability and conflict have undermined the economy, reducing still further the country's ability to emerge from its crisis. Private business and investment have plummeted, while agriculture, which accounts for nearly 90 per cent of economic activity, has been disrupted by population displacement and widespread insecurity. On top of this, foreign aid levels fell dramatically after the events of October 1993: preliminary figures for 1995 suggest that the level of overall assistance was only one third of that for 1992. Donors have indicated that the decline is likely to continue in 1996.

15. As a result of these dire economic conditions, humanitarian assistance and its associated services have become a major factor within the overall economy and a significant source of both relief and employment. Recently, however, humanitarian activities have been held hostage to political violence. As a result, the increasing needs generated by the ongoing conflict are matched by a corresponding decrease in the willingness and capacity of the international community to respond. Relief aid programmes in Burundi have to provide assistance to internally displaced persons and the few returnees who are repatriating from Zaire and the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as to Rwandan refugees.

16. Following a series of attacks against representatives of United Nations agencies, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Burundi and the consequent suspension of most humanitarian operations, I requested the High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata, to travel to Bujumbura to see what measures could be taken to address the issue of insecurity and allow humanitarian organizations to function effectively. Her findings were summarized in my letter of 16 January 1996 to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/36). Further to this letter and to the Council's endorsement of her recommendations, I dispatched a technical team to Burundi from 27 January to 3 February 1996 to review the possible role United Nations guards could play in providing enhanced security to the humanitarian community.

17. The team, led by Mr. Charles Petrie of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, travelled to Bujumbura and to the north-eastern province of Muyinga. Discussions were held with representatives of United Nations agencies, NGOs, OAU and donors. Although the team did not meet representatives of the Government of Burundi in Bujumbura, because of the strongly negative reaction of the Government to the concept of United Nations guards, it had substantive discussions with the Governor and the Military Commander of Muyinga Province.

18. In its report to me, the team concluded that, in the current context of violence and instability, United Nations guards would not be able to guarantee the security of humanitarian personnel in Burundi; indeed, in the present environment, the guards could themselves become potential targets for extremist groups, thus intensifying the security problems already faced by the international humanitarian effort.

19. Should a real process of genuine political dialogue begin, however, United Nations guards could play a significant role in helping to monitor the implementation of agreements reached by the opposing groups. By their physical presence and visibility in areas of unrest, they would demonstrate the international community's commitment to supporting this process and encourage both sides to honour their agreements. They could also play an important role in supporting and complementing the operations of the OAU military observers. Finally, the structures set up at the provincial levels by these guards would serve to reinforce the operations of the security committees agreed to by the Government of Burundi in discussions in January with my Special Envoy, Mrs. Ogata. Regrettably, these committees have not yet been set up.

20. While it is thus possible to envisage a role for United Nations guards, it will first be necessary to overcome significant opposition from the Government to the idea, as well as scepticism from the international humanitarian community in Burundi, including both the United Nations agencies and NGOs. Although the Government is still stating its opposition to the idea, indications have been received that it could be possible to pursue it at a later stage.

21. I accordingly see little point in pursuing the option of United Nations guards for the time being. However, since the technical team has reported that the deployment of such guards could be both desirable and feasible if the political situation improves, I intend to keep this option under constant review.

V. PREVENTIVE ACTION

22. The objective of the international community must be to prevent the escalation of present tensions in Burundi into full-scale civil war, ethnic violence and genocide. The risk of such developments in Burundi has been demonstrated by the events of October 1993 and earlier outbreaks of violence. Apart from the casualties and the human suffering another such catastrophe would entail, it would almost certainly lead to massive flows of refugees into neighbouring countries. This in turn would lead to further regional destabilization, as well as the expenditure of billions of dollars on humanitarian relief services over an extended period. The costs of preventive action must be examined in this context.

23. Preventive diplomacy should remain the preferred mode of conflict management and resolution, especially when the parties to a dispute are prepared to engage in a constructive dialogue to overcome their differences. However, in situations where a meaningful dialogue cannot be achieved and the conflict threatens to escalate along the lines mentioned in the preceding paragraph, preventive diplomacy alone may no longer be sufficient. It then becomes necessary to consider other steps of a preventive nature, including those with a military aspect, to persuade the parties to leave the path of confrontation.

24. It remains my belief that the situation in Burundi has reached this stage and that, less than two years after the genocide in Rwanda, the international community must not again be caught unprepared. Resolute preventive action should, therefore, be taken to minimize the risks of a similar tragedy in

Burundi. While every effort should continue to be made to convince the parties to engage in serious negotiations and mutual accommodation, the Security Council may at the same time wish to call on Member States to begin consultations on other options, in case it should become clear that pursuit of the political option is not sufficient to prevent a further deterioration of the situation.

25. I have reviewed some of the ideas put forward in this regard and, in light of the preliminary contingency planning undertaken by the Secretariat, I believe that it would be useful, at this stage, to consider the possibility of establishing a standby multinational force for humanitarian intervention. For this purpose, consultations would be undertaken by a group of countries with a proven rapid deployment capability, including some African countries. The aim would be for the countries concerned to earmark contingents for participation in the multinational force that would remain in their respective home countries but would be fully trained and equipped, so as to be ready for deployment at very short notice.

26. Once the initial consultations and planning had been completed, the Security Council could review the situation and, in the absence of significant progress in the political dialogue, decide to establish a multinational force. The Council could also decide to give prior authorization, on a contingency basis, for the deployment of the multinational force to Burundi in the event that ethnic violence erupts there on a large scale.

27. The proposed multinational force would be established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations and led by one Member State. This approach would seem to be necessary, as the Government of Burundi has indicated that it would not consent to any kind of foreign humanitarian operation with a military component on its territory. Moreover, the lessons drawn from the United Nations experience of the last few years in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Haiti and Rwanda suggest that, in situations where there is no consent and/or no peace to keep, better results are likely to be achieved through a multinational operation that can create the conditions for the subsequent deployment of a United Nations peace-keeping operation.

28. Should it become necessary to undertake a humanitarian military intervention in Burundi, its mandate would be to deter massacres, to provide security to refugees, displaced persons and civilians at risk and to protect key economic installations. The force would be deployed to selected areas of actual or potential confrontation.

29. Under a worst-case scenario, it is estimated that the force would require up to five brigade groups, representing a total of 25,000 troops. These troops would be deployed by strategic air and sea lift and would include parachute, motorized and mechanized units, light tanks, artillery and combat engineers, as well as logistic and administrative units. It is also estimated that there would be a requirement for force multipliers in the form of command, control and communications, close air support and attack helicopters.

30. All parties in Burundi would be clearly warned that any attack on the multinational force would draw an immediate and forceful response. At the same time, the parties would be advised that the operation had a strictly

humanitarian purpose and that it would therefore not engage in combat against them, as long as they did not seek to prevent it from implementing its mandate. Should the parties in Burundi decide not to adopt a hostile attitude, it would then be possible to reduce the force level significantly and only some of the units on standby would need to be deployed. It is estimated that, under such circumstances, 5,000 to 8,000 troops might suffice.

31. The deployment of a multinational force to Burundi would require staging areas in one or more of the neighbouring countries, which would be used to carry out the required training, coordination and integration of the various units prior to the launching of actual operations. Discussions with the neighbouring countries would therefore need to be initiated to ascertain their readiness to provide the necessary facilities for the multinational force.

32. The idea of preventive deployment suggested in my letter of 29 December 1995 (S/1995/1068) may also be considered in this context. Indeed, there may be some merit in advance deployment, in one of the neighbouring countries, of a force headquarters and of core logistics elements that would strengthen the rapid deployment capability of the multinational force. Such an advance deployment could enhance the credibility of the multinational force and underscore the resolve of the international community not to allow another genocide in the Great Lakes region.

33. The duration of such a humanitarian operation would of course depend on the speed with which the situation in the country could be stabilized. Once that had been achieved, the responsibility could be transferred to a United Nations peace-keeping mission under Chapter VI of the Charter, which would be given the task of maintaining the stability established by the multinational operation and of reactivating the political reconciliation process. This effort would need to be supported from the outset by a substantial programme to provide relief assistance, to strengthen basic State institutions (civil administration, judiciary and police) and to facilitate short-term economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.

34. Following the adoption of resolution 1040 (1996), I wrote to the Secretary-General of OAU, Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, on 25 January, setting out the options that I had identified for major preventive action and which I had already communicated to the Security Council in my letters of 29 December 1995 and 16 January 1996 and in an oral briefing on 19 January. In an oral response to my letter, Mr. Salim recalled that the OAU Summit of June 1995 had seriously considered the option of military intervention if there should be a dramatic deterioration in the security situation in Burundi. This option was to be pursued in cooperation with the United Nations. Those whom he had consulted after receiving my letter had shared fully my concern that the international community should respond effectively to the threat of intensified internal conflict in that country. Such a response should not exclude, if circumstances so necessitated, the option of military intervention for humanitarian purposes.

35. In a meeting that I had with him on 14 February 1996, I outlined to Mr. Salim in greater detail the proposal that I would be making to the Security Council, stressing that its purpose was strictly humanitarian and that it was designed to forestall possible genocide and a massive exodus of refugees. It

would be more cost-effective, in both time and financial terms, to prepare such contingency plans and be ready with them than to start preparing them after the need for humanitarian intervention had actually arisen. Mr. Salim replied that while priority should be given to the political option, he believed that in the event of a dramatic deterioration of the situation, African countries would support intervention aimed at averting the type of disaster that had been experienced in Rwanda.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

36. As members of the Council are aware, this report represents the fourth occasion in under seven weeks that I have brought the issue of Burundi to their attention. I have done this in the conviction that, whatever the criteria - political, security, humanitarian or economic - the situation in the country is desperately serious.

37. I fully share the view that the collective efforts of the international community should be deployed to encourage dialogue among all sections of the Burundian political spectrum. As mentioned in section II above, the efforts of the President and the Prime Minister have, to some extent, succeeded in calming the situation in the country somewhat. I myself as well as my Special Representative will continue to support their endeavours. OAU as well as others, including, in particular, Mr. Nyerere, could also play a significant role in promoting a dialogue. However, it would not be prudent, and would in fact not be responsible, for the international community to assume the success of these efforts and not prepare and plan for contingency measures to avoid a catastrophe. Such measures have to be planned to avoid a possible tragedy and not merely to deal with it after it has occurred.

38. As regards United Nations guards, the time is not yet ripe for their deployment, given the factors referred to in section IV above. However, I continue to believe that, should the political dynamics of confrontation change in favour of dialogue and should the Government agree to their deployment, the dispatch of a contingent of guards could be a useful measure. In the meantime, additional funds are urgently needed to strengthen existing inter-agency security mechanisms in Burundi. Member States are urged to respond generously to the requests which will be made to them in the coming days.

39. Any solution to the crisis in Burundi will depend on the combined political will of the parties in conflict and of the international community. It is the responsibility of the parties to find the strength and courage to embark on the path of mutual accommodation and national reconciliation. Despite the efforts of my Special Representative and others, in particular Mr. Nyerere, I regret to state that no significant progress has yet been achieved in the establishment of the broad-based political dialogue which, in my opinion and that of many others, including OAU, is the only way to achieve these goals.

40. I also regret that the international community failed to respond adequately to the recommendations of the two missions sent by the Security Council to Burundi in August 1994 and February 1995. I refer, in particular, to the technical, advisory and financial assistance that Member States could provide to

Burundi in its efforts to integrate more Hutus in the civil administration, the security forces and the judiciary system, to silence hate radios and to organize the crucial national debate. I also refer to the recommendation to impose selective measures on certain known extremists (denial of visas, freezing of foreign assets, etc.). Such measures, as well as the assistance referred to above, could have a very positive effect.

41. There is abundant evidence that the people of Burundi, particularly their leaders, pay attention to the words and actions of the Security Council. This is why those who want dialogue and coexistence have put their hopes in the Council. Pressure must be maintained on the political leaders and, although the Government's official response to my proposals for United Nations action remains negative, it is widely believed in Bujumbura that the consideration of strong steps by the Council is essential. In this connection, the international community - including the Council, individual donor countries and Burundi's neighbours - must act in a coherent and concerted way. If it does, the extremists on both sides will not be under any illusions that they can exploit perceived differences and continue to destabilize the country with impunity.

42. It is important to note that it is some of the Burundian military and their extremist allies who are most opposed to the concept of international intervention or preventive deployment. The challenge before the international community is whether to take an initiative that is welcomed by those who want peace or whether to allow the extremists to retain their veto over effective international action.

43. While preventive diplomacy is always the preferred course of action, there are some situations when it must be backed by a credible threat to use force, in order to stave off humanitarian disaster. I am convinced that an assertive approach involving contingency planning by some Member States, as recommended in section V above, would improve the chances of convincing the parties in Burundi to show more flexibility, thereby obviating the need for direct military involvement by the international community.

44. Much has been said about the need for preventive diplomacy in the post-cold-war era. The Security Council itself has been at the forefront in urging the United Nations to concentrate more on preventive work. Burundi is a test case for the United Nations ability to take such action. Indeed it could even contribute to the continuing search for a workable system of collective security at a time when civil wars and ethnic conflicts are becoming increasingly frequent.

45. The warning signs in Burundi have been with us for some time. If another tragedy befalls the Burundian people and the international community again proves to be unprepared, despite all the warnings, it will cause untold human suffering and gravely damage the credibility of the United Nations. It is in this spirit that I present my recommendations to the Security Council.

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S/1996/117
16 February 1996
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LETTER DATED 15 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, and with reference to the letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America dated 24 January 1996 (S/1996/613), relating to the interception and inspection of the vessel Michael-R by United States naval forces, I wish to shed further light on the misleading allegations and false justifications in the letter, which do not accord with the facts.

1. The second paragraph of the letter states that contrary to what was stated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq in the letter which he addressed to the President of the Security Council, the vessel was not inspected by the United States Navy but by United States naval forces, whereas the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs does not refer to the United States Navy, but indicates that interception and inspection of the vessel was carried out by forces of the United States Navy. It is a fact that it was indeed United States naval forces which intercepted and inspected the vessel, and not other naval forces of any other nationality.

2. The Permanent Representative of the United States, in the third paragraph of her letter, claims that the vessel was not forced to proceed to Bahrain and that United States naval forces inspectors initially found that the cargo was inaccessible and could not be safely inspected, and that the vessel was allowed to proceed directly to its destination after only a brief delay. In fact the commander of the vessel advised the Basra port authorities that United States naval forces, after having intercepted the vessel in the Arabian Gulf, told him, on 23 December at 4 p.m., to proceed to Bahrain for a second inspection.

3. In the fourth paragraph, the Permanent Representative of the United States claims that inspection must be such as to expedite the passage of authorized cargoes to their destinations. In fact this vessel, chartered on behalf of the World Food Programme, a United Nations agency, had all the necessary official documentation issued by the United Nations. As a result of its interception by United States naval forces, the vessel, which was to have

reached the port of Umm Qasr (Basra) on 23 December 1995, did not in fact arrive until 1 January 1996, after wearisome efforts by World Food Programme officials to secure its release. In such circumstances how can a delay of nine days be termed a brief delay, as claimed by the United States Permanent Representative? Moreover, this delay subjected the commander of the vessel and his crew to severe hardship, their only wrong being to transport a humanitarian cargo, authenticated by official documentation issued by the United Nations.

4. The World Food Programme and all those who have followed this affair are aware of the truth. The incident demonstrates once again that the United States wishes to tighten the total embargo imposed on the Iraqi people in the context of a genocidal war with hidden aims which bear no relation to the resolutions and Charter of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/1996/117*
16 February 1996
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* Reissued for technical reasons.

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(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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S/1996/118
16 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolutions 1027 (1996) and 1046 (1996) concerning the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Following consultations with the Government, I wish to inform the Security Council of my intention to appoint Brigadier-General Bo Lennart Wranker of Sweden as Force Commander of UNPREDEP. Brigadier-General Wranker is to take up his functions on 1 March 1996.

I should be grateful if you could bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

96-03825 (E) 160296 170296

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S/1996/119
16 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 16 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 14 February 1996 (S/1996/118) concerning the appointment of Brigadier-General Bo Lennart Wranker of Sweden as Force Commander of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They welcome the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Madeleine Korbel ALBRIGHT
President of the Security Council

96-03831 (E) 160296 170296

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LETTER DATED 15 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a table showing the 971 miscellaneous bombs, rockets, shells, mines and other ordnance, some of the remnants of the 30-Power aggression against Iraq, that were found and disposed of in all parts of Iraq in the period 1-21 January 1996.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-03844 (E) 200296 200296 210296

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Annex

Bomb-disposal statement, 1-21 January 1996

No.	Civil Defence Department	Number and type of ordnance disposed of
1	Baghdad	1 82-mm mortar shell 1 assault hand-grenade 139 detonators for 82-mm shells 18 tail and head assemblies for RPG-7 rockets 1 launcher rocket
2	Basra	5 cluster bombs 1 cruise missile 1 2,000-lb aircraft missile 2 500-lb aircraft missiles 730 anti-personnel mines 15 RPG-7 rockets 21 anti-tank mines 1 82-mm mortar shell
3	Ta'mim	2 hand-grenades 1 mortar shell 17 DShK barrels
4	Anbar	1 explosive charge 1 explosive charge of TNT
5	Muthanna	2 obsolete spherical bombs
6	Najaf	1 regular detonator 1 82-mm mortar shell
7	Qadisiyah	1 hand-grenade
8	Diyala	2 assault grenades
9	Dhi Qar	6 cluster bombs
	Total	971 (nine hundred and seventy-one) miscellaneous bombs, shells, rockets and mines

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20 February 1996
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ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 19 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BURUNDI TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

In its concern to keep the United Nations and the international community abreast of the situation in our country, the Government of Burundi endeavours to communicate regularly to the Security Council, through its President, information which might enable the Council to propose appropriate solutions to the ongoing crisis in Burundi.

Because it is anxious to see the Security Council play a really positive role, the Government of Burundi, through its Prime Minister, has instructed me to transmit to you the attached document, which describes the very positive developments taking place in the context of the overall policy of restoring peace and security and thus shows that the gravity of the crisis is diminishing substantially. The Government of Burundi would be grateful if you would have this message distributed as a document to all the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Térence NSANZE
Permanent Representative

96-03886 (E) 200296 200296 210296

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Annex

Letter dated 18 February 1996 from the Prime Minister of Burundi addressed to the Permanent Representative of Burundi to the United Nations

I am transmitting the following information for the attention of the United Nations Security Council:

It is clear from what Burundi's political actors are saying and doing that there is increasing unanimity and that the differences in their political interpretation of the crisis are obviously disappearing. The third phase of the nationwide public awareness campaign to promote the return to peace and security now shows that the President of the Republic, the President of the National Assembly, the Prime Minister, members of the Government and members of the National Assembly all share the same views on the main issues, namely, identification of the enemies of peace and the strategy for combating them. This is a new and welcome development, even if there are still minor disagreements on some aspects of the strategy.

There is greater cohesion within the executive branch, in other words, among the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and the Government as a whole, as a result of a frank and thorough dialogue within the Government, which is guiding the process of restoring peace and trust in the country. The statements being made in the field attest to this development; the President of the Republic confirmed it at his press conference held last Friday, 16 February 1996; the President of the National Assembly reported it to his interlocutors on his latest trip to Italy and Switzerland; and I am doing likewise with our European partners on my current trip.

Trust is being restored between the forces of law and order and the population. Indeed, in several parts of the country, the general public are turning systematically to the forces of law and order whenever danger threatens. There is perfect cooperation between the population, the forces of law and order and the local authorities in many of the country's communes when it comes to tracking down armed gangs and other criminals who are threatening security. As a result, criminal activity by armed gangs has declined sharply. This is an encouraging development.

In short, the spirit of confrontation is now giving way to a spirit of conciliation, thereby markedly strengthening the authority of the State and increasing the chances for the Government to succeed before long in the mission of restoring peace and confidence entrusted to it by the Convention on Governance.

I should be grateful if you would convey these observations to the United Nations Security Council, so that it can update its information on the situation in Burundi and take positions that offer encouragement to the Government. The contribution which Burundi expects from the United Nations was amply explained in the Government's positions expressed on 3 January and 28 January 1996, as well as in the letter dated 13 February 1996, addressed to the President of the

Security Council, which was signed jointly by the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister.

(Signed) Antoine NDUWAYO
Prime Minister

UNITED NATIONS **A S**

General Assembly
Security Council

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A/51/69
S/1996/122
23 February 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT:
REGIONAL DISARMAMENT
REVIEW AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE
TWELFTH SPECIAL SESSION OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY: REGIONAL
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 20 February 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I am transmitting herewith a copy of the statement by the guarantor countries of the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, 1942, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Itamaraty Peace Declaration of 17 February 1995.

I should be grateful if you would have this note and its annex distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under the agenda items entitled "General and complete disarmament: regional disarmament" and "Review and implementation of the concluding document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly: regional confidence-building measures", and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Luis VALENCIA RODRIGUEZ
Permanent Representative

96-04252 (E) 230296 230296 260296

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ANNEX*

Statement by the guarantor countries of the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, 1942, on the occasion of the first anniversary of the Itamaraty Peace Declaration

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On the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the Itamaraty Peace Declaration of 17 February 1995, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the guarantor countries of the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, 1942, Guido di Tella of Argentina, Luiz Felipe Lampreia of Brazil, José Miguel Insulsa of Chile and Warren Christopher of the United States of America, express their satisfaction at the significant progress made towards complete détente in the relations between Ecuador and Peru, aimed at a final solution to the conflict between the two countries.

One year since this solemn commitment entered into force, they note with profound satisfaction that efforts to ensure a peaceful solution have been successful. In the context of the Itamaraty Peace Declaration and under the coordination of the military observers of the guarantor countries, a cease-fire was established in the conflict zone, putting an immediate end to the loss of human lives, and a separation of military forces was put into effect, thereby avoiding the risk of further clashes. Building on this initial peace effort, a process of mutual confidence and good faith was set in motion which is permitting the gradual transfer to the parties of the tasks and responsibilities of the Ecuador-Peru Military Observer Mission (MOMEP), with a view to ensuring, in conjunction with the guarantor countries, peace in the region. On the understanding that MOMEP will be a factor in consolidating this process, the guarantor countries express their full confidence in the Observer Mission and in the procedures agreed to in that body. In this context, they are prepared to consider an eventual request by the parties for the extension, for a limited period, of the presence of military observers.

They recall that a new and decisive phase in the peace process is now beginning which presents its own challenges. They note with satisfaction the spirit of openness which prevailed at the meeting held in Lima on 17 and 18 January 1996 between the Foreign Ministers of Ecuador and Peru, pursuant to the terms of the Itamaraty Peace Declaration. That meeting enabled the parties to discuss their differences, in direct and frank talks, with a view to finding a common and definitive solution.

In recognition of their invaluable contribution in exercising the important responsibilities entrusted to them by the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, the guarantor countries were invited to take part in the meeting, and, at the request of the parties, Brazil will host the substantive negotiations that are to follow. The guarantor countries emphasize that the performance of these

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* Translator's note: translated from an unofficial Spanish translation.

functions requires that they enjoy autonomy in exercising their full capacity to state their views, in such manner and at such time as they deem appropriate, on the progress of the peace process.

Convinced that the adoption of mutual confidence-building measures is essential for promoting a climate of dialogue and harmony, they especially welcome the talks held between the Foreign Ministers of Ecuador and Peru and also the specific proposals for preventing the risks of an arms race in the region. Accordingly, the parties can continue to count on the ongoing efforts of the guarantor countries, including efforts to secure the necessary cooperation of the international community.

Desiring to see the common ground reached at Lima expanded further, they emphasize the importance of the next meeting, to be held at Quito on 22 and 23 February, between Foreign Ministers Galo Leoro Franco and Francisco Tudela, with the participation of senior officials of the guarantor countries.

Aware of the responsibilities and expectations for the consolidation of peace, the guarantor countries are convinced that all the parties will make every effort to ensure that further decisive steps are taken to launch the negotiations on technical, legal and substantive issues with all due speed and determination, so that 1996 will be remembered as the year of peace.

The ongoing faithful compliance with the commitments made in the Itamaraty Peace Declaration has created unique conditions for finding a definitive solution to the conflict. Firm in this conviction, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the guarantor countries will continue to cooperate, determinedly and confidently, in ensuring the full implementation of the Itamaraty Peace Declaration, in keeping with our peoples' aspirations for peaceful coexistence and prosperity.

Brasilia, 16 February 1996

UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/50/879
S/1996/123
23 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 55
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 15 February 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 14 February 1996, addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Osman Ertuğ, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. ÇELEM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-04185 (E) 230296 240296

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ANNEX

Letter dated 14 February 1996 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ
to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to bring to your attention a new development in southern Cyprus which has grave implications for the process of negotiations, conducted within your mission of good offices, and the peaceful solution of the Cyprus question. The said development involves the adoption on 8 February 1996 of a unanimous resolution by the Greek Cypriot House of Representatives, which, among other things, rules out any negotiation or even discussion of the issue of sovereignty. It also omits any reference to the finding of a bicommunal, bizonal federal solution to the Cyprus question, which has long been agreed as the only feasible settlement of the dispute.

It is significant to note that the said resolution comes barely a month after a similar unanimous decision by the Greek Cypriot "National Council" on 9 January 1996, which states that the issue of sovereignty cannot be made the subject of any negotiation or even discussion, and rejects bilateral negotiations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot sides on grounds of an alleged lack of "common ground", thereby adding a new dimension to the manifest intransigence of the other side.

You are well aware that the fundamental issue of sovereignty has always been on the agenda of the intercommunal talks, and the set of ideas you put forward in 1992 deals with this question by stating that it "emanates equally from both communities. One community cannot claim sovereignty over the other community" (see annex to S/24472 of 21 August 1992). By refusing even to discuss this subject let alone negotiate it, the Greek Cypriot side, in effect, is repudiating one of the agreed parameters of a solution and erecting a new and serious obstacle in the way of a negotiated settlement. This fact, coupled with the omission of even a passing reference to a bicommunal, bizonal federation based on the political equality of the two sides, once more demonstrates how far the Greek Cypriot side is from a just and lasting settlement.

Some of the other features of this unfortunate resolution are the further intensification of the international propaganda campaign against the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey, already running in high gear; recourse to international bodies on humanitarian issues, such as the question of missing persons, in spite of the other side's known bad faith on this issue; misrepresentation of the recent Customs Union agreement between the European Union and Turkey; and collaboration between the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece in promoting their case in Europe.

You will appreciate that the above has devastating consequences for the relations between the two communities, already suffering from a deep crisis of confidence and the refusal of the other side to implement the confidence-building measures, and constitutes a severe blow to efforts for the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the resumption of direct dialogue between the two parties.

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I wish to stress that this totally negative and adversarial resolution is perhaps the most damaging document that has emerged from the Greek Cypriot legislative body since the infamous "ENOSIS resolution" of 26 June 1967, envisaging the annexation of Cyprus to Greece, which has never been repealed.

At a time when efforts are under way to resume direct negotiations between the two sides, this resolution undermines the very basis of the negotiating process for a peaceful solution, and once more exposes the total lack of political will on the part of the Greek Cypriot side for a negotiated settlement. I have no doubt that the situation created by this ominous development will be appropriately evaluated by you as well as the international community, in your efforts to help achieve a just and lasting solution in Cyprus.

I would be grateful if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/124
22 February 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 19 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that violations of the Republic of Iraq's airspace by United States, British and French aircraft continued over the period 1-15 February 1996 and that those aircraft carried out reconnaissance and engaged in acts of provocation. The details are as follows:

1. In the northern region 115 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Aqrah, Amadiyah, Tall Afar and Ayn Zalah.

2. In the southern region 608 sorties were flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 6,000 to 9,000 metres, over the following Iraqi cities and towns: Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Artawi, Busayyah, Lasaf, Qurnah, Chabaish, Shatrah, Shu`aybah, Qal`at Salih and Salman.

3. On 18 occasions United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at speeds of 600 kilometres per hour and at altitudes of 20,000 metres violated the Republic of Iraq's airspace in the southern region before leaving in the direction of Kuwait.

You are requested to intervene with the countries in question with a view to bringing a halt to actions that, as flagrant violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international law, pose a threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq.

These actions continue to alarm the civilian population and to cause serious damage to private and public property. The Republic of Iraq asserts its right to seek legal compensation for the damage being inflicted on the Iraqi people and the Iraqi State.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-04137 (E) 230296 230296
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UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/125
23 February 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 22 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CAMEROON ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Further to my letter of 28 March 1994 (S/1994/351) and on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you and the members of the Security Council of recent developments in the dispute between my country, Cameroon, and Nigeria concerning the Bakassi Peninsula.

In this connection, I should like to recall that in March 1994, Cameroon referred this border and territorial dispute to the International Court of Justice.

At the very time when this case is pending before the Court, since 3 February 1996 Nigerian troops have been advancing further into Cameroonian territory and launching artillery attacks on Cameroonian positions, causing loss of human life and considerable material damage.

Given the seriousness of this situation, the prolongation of which could threaten the maintenance of international peace and security in the region, I request the Security Council to urge Nigeria to withdraw to the territorial positions which it occupied prior to its 21 December 1993 military aggression.

I should be grateful if, in conformity with the letter dated 29 April 1994 (S/1994/519) addressed to the Governments of Cameroon and Nigeria by the President of the Security Council, you would invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations to report to the Security Council on the overall situation and the latest serious incidents in the Bakassi Peninsula.

I should also be grateful if you would have the text of this letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ferdinand Leopold OYONO

96-04238 (E) 230296 230296 260296

Annex I

Letter dated 28 January 1996 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cameroon addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nigeria

NOTE OF PROTEST

Following my meeting with the High Commissioner of the Federal Republic of Nigeria at Yaoundé on 4 February 1996, at which I lodged the vigorous protest of the Government of the Republic of Cameroon at the attack launched on 3 February 1996 by your country's military forces, from the Cameroonian territory which they have been occupying since December 1993, against the Cameroonian armed forces based in the Bakassi Peninsula, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

By engaging, on 17 February 1996, in a further military attack on my country, the Nigerian Government has, for the fourth consecutive time, taken upon itself, in defiance of its international obligations, the heavy responsibility of pursuing hostilities against the Cameroonian army in the Bakassi Peninsula. In so doing, it has also:

1. Ignored the appeals for peace launched since 1994 by numerous States, the United Nations Security Council and the Organization of African Unity, calling on Cameroon and Nigeria to refrain from the threat and use of force as means of settling the border and territorial dispute between them in the Bakassi Peninsula.

2. Broken the commitments to a cessation of military hostilities entered into by our two countries in the joint communiqués signed on 7 July 1994 and 17 February 1996 at Kara, Togo, under the sponsorship of President Gnasingbe Eyadema, Togo's Head of State.

There is no longer any doubt that, by its repetition of this belligerent behaviour, Nigeria means to disrupt consideration by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) of this territorial and border dispute, which has been referred to it for a legal ruling.

The Government of the Republic of Cameroon once again lodges officially and formally a vigorous protest against these acts of aggression, which pose a real threat to the civilian population of the Bakassi region and to the maintenance of good neighbourly relations and the prolongation of which seriously threatens the maintenance of peace and security in the subregion. At the same time, it calls on the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to heed the voice of wisdom, which counsels the withdrawal of troops from the Bakassi Peninsula and the return of the civilian populations displaced from this area, pending completion of the process of judicial settlement set in motion at the International Court of Justice.

In this connection, I reaffirm here the willingness of the Government of Cameroon to work for the maintenance of peace in the Bakassi Peninsula, while

awaiting the judgement of the International Court of Justice, in keeping with the spirit of the Tunis and Kara (Togo) agreements.

Moreover, bearing in mind the loss of civilian lives caused in these attacks by Nigerian troops against the Cameroonian army and the serious risks faced by the civilian population not only of a repetition of such attacks but also of an increase in military tensions, and concerned to protect the lives of this population, the Government of the Republic of Cameroon informs the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria that it has decided to henceforth prohibit all fishing activity in this area of military hostilities, pending completion of the negotiations under way at Kara, Togo, to secure peace in this region, without prejudice to the action taken before ICJ.

Lastly, the Government of the Republic of Cameroon reaffirms its determination to pursue a peaceful judicial settlement of this dispute, as the only lasting guarantee of peace and security between the two countries.

(Signed) Ferdinand Leopold OYONO

Annex II

Statement by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon concerning the Bakassi Peninsula

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The European Union, deeply concerned at the repetition of incidents which threaten domestic peace and regional stability in Africa and at border disputes which could open the door to innumerable territorial claims, deplores the use of military force by the parties concerned and expresses its concern at the conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon over the Bakassi Peninsula and at the signs of a further military confrontation, perceptible since 3 February 1996.

The Union calls on the parties to the dispute to refrain from any military intervention, in conformity with international law and, in particular, with the Charter of the United Nations, and expresses the hope that a peaceful solution will be found to this conflict through its referral to the International Court of Justice.

The European Union requests the parties to return to the positions which they occupied before the dispute was referred to the International Court of Justice.

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S/1996/126
23 February 1996

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda items 10, 20 (b), 28, 30, 81, 92
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE WORK OF THE ORGANIZATION
STRENGTHENING OF THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INCLUDING SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE: SPECIAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES OR REGIONS
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES OF CROATIA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Note verbale dated 20 February 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour, on instructions from the Government of the Republic of Bulgaria, to transmit herewith the text of the statement of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria, His Excellency Mr. Jean Videnov, on Bulgaria's foreign policy and the future of the Balkans, delivered at a meeting with the Diplomatic Corps at Sofia on 7 February 1996 (see annex).

The Permanent Representative of Bulgaria would appreciate it if the text of the present letter and its annex were circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 10, 20 (b), 28, 30, 81 and 91, and of the Security Council.

ANNEX

Statement of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria on Bulgaria's foreign policy and the future of the Balkans, delivered at a meeting with the Diplomatic Corps at Sofia on 7 February 1996

Most of you will probably recall that a year ago, on 3 February 19 met in this very hall in order to inform you about the foreign policy i of the newly elected Government of the Democratic Left.

An objective analysis of the period under review would show that i foreign policy area, as indeed in all other areas, the Government has consistently pursued the objectives it had announced then: European orientation, regional stability and regional security and cooperation.

These guidelines presupposed a better balance of different trends corresponding activation in some along with the required continuity in policy. In addition the country's foreign policy activity had to be ad

Continuity is to be found in all areas in which our foreign policy active in recent years. This holds true of the promotion of relations partners like the United States of America and a number of the Far East countries. We made an effort to intensify relations with traditional p like the Russian Federation and other CIS countries, the central Europe countries and a number of Middle East and also of Latin American States general, what had been set as an objective - continuity, balance and pr was more or less achieved.

It was particularly important that we made an essential step in on three main lines of our foreign policy - the European one. At the Euro Council meeting in Madrid last December, the Government officially subm Bulgaria's application for accession to the European Union. It is note that a week ago the second meeting of the Bulgaria-EU Association Counc appreciated what the Government and the country had done so far on Euro issues. The recent letter from the Italian chair to inform that the Bu accession application was officially forwarded is yet another recogniti

Naturally, the Bulgarian policy's European line intersects with ma and problems that the country daily confronts in the region where we li

This brings me to the problems of regional stabilization. Last ye Bulgaria continued to abide consistently by the line it had pursued thr the conflict west of our borders. That line was expressed in consisten restraint and non-interference, parity to the sides to the conflict, a approach seeking a gradual elimination of the economic sanctions regime with progress in the peaceful settlement of the conflict.

consequence of the enforcement of the United Nations-imposed economic s
In our view, the question of overcoming the consequences of the sanctio
not be overlooked.

Naturally, we welcomed the decision to start a peace process with
involvement of all parties to the conflict. Therefore, we welcome the
and, moreover, we are ready to support it in every way in all its aspec
the scope of our capabilities.

Conclusion of the peace agreements opens up new prospects to stepp
efforts to the benefit of regional security and cooperation, the third
Government's foreign policy priorities.

In our opinion, two groups of tasks are today facing the internati
community and particularly the countries of the region in the present p
conflict period. The first group covers the successful implementation
framework peace agreements on Bosnia and Herzegovina; the second group
the broader aspects of the creating of prerequisites, and in future, of
mechanisms for lasting security and intensive cooperation in the region

With respect to the former, Bulgaria has already affirmed its read
contribute as much as it can to the implementation of the military aspe
the peace process. We expect that the specific conditions of the Bulga
contribution to the multinational forces mission in Bosnia will be agre
a result of this dialogue.

We too share the view that exclusively military forms applied on t
and dissociated from civilian and humanitarian forms cannot guarantee t
achievement of lasting peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina or in the adjoin
regions. We share Karl Bildt's opinion that the improvement of people'
its normalization, the solution of elementary daily problems and the re
of the processes of reconstruction and reintegration are of critical im

Therefore, today, with greater conviction, we voice our proposals
Bulgaria's active inclusion in the various both urgent and long-term
reconstruction programmes. We are encouraged by the initial positive r
by the EU and the other international structures. However, we expect a
towards active practical implementation. Bulgaria has the required cap
capabilities and conditions. There is the geographic proximity and goo
knowledge of the region and conditions to work there. We have a number
proved competitive advantages that should be used in the reconstruction
programmes in the region.

With regard to security, development and cooperation between count
the region today, we believe there can be five possible lines of action

- Establishment of lasting good-neighbourly relations. We belie
  Balkan countries must unambiguously reaffirm principles like

- Transborder cooperation. Recognition of the inviolability of should not presuppose that they are hermetically sealed. Thes cover a wide range: passport and customs regulations and form cooperation in the effort to combat illicit traffic and immigr etc;

- Accelerated and intensive development of transport, telecommun and energy infrastructure in compliance with European standard the nine principal trans-European networks agreed on by the tr ministers of Europe in Crete in 1994. Infrastructure developm important as a precondition for better communications and also attraction of private and public investment, and naturally, as factor of political stability;

- Promotion of trade and investment; establishment of free trade harmonization of legislation in line with international standa expectations; making the region attractive and competitive fro point of view of investors and in comparison to other regions world;

- Bilateral and multilateral solution of legal, cultural and soc issues by legal instruments and administrative procedures faci the freedom of movement from the receptive countries. Complic arising in ethnic relations will be successfully solved in thi context.

We are aware that unless the external key factors of the internati community are positively involved, local initiatives will find it hard through and yield results.

Advancement in each of these areas depends first and foremost on t countries of the region. With this concept in mind, Bulgaria's Governm like to suggest the following formats for practical action.

Let me start with Balkan cooperation. The format today covers Alb Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey, Cr Macedonia and Yugoslavia. The pan-Balkan process was retarded but not discontinued or destroyed by the conflict in former Yugoslavia. May I that the last meeting of Balkan Foreign Ministers at Tirana in 1990 too decision that the next meeting should take place in the capital of Bulg Sofia. Bulgaria is ready to a host a meeting of the Balkan Foreign Min The agenda might include joint efforts to enforce the frame agreements in Bosnia and cover the above-stated five lines of joint action.

Infrastructure development is the next set of issues around which efforts of the parties concerned could focus. To put it mildly, entire countries in the region, the new ones in particular, are far from moder communication standards. The existing infrastructure needs to be inter

Last November, Bulgaria hosted an OSCE seminar on the role of infrastructures in the Black Sea region. The work and conclusions of t seminar outlined the practical need of a focal converging point where r exchange of information and contacts on infrastructure issues will be m believe Sofia could be a suitable centre in this respect. We believe t active cooperation will be possible in the future on these issues betwe countries of the Black Sea Cooperation Region and the Central European Initiative.

Other initiatives of European cooperation should be launched in cl correspondence with European aspirations and calling of the peoples and societies of the Balkan region.

EU members or associated countries are called on to play an active this respect. Bulgaria has already felt the advantages of this type of cooperation with its neighbours Greece and Romania. It will be natural to expand this circle by making regular contact with the other "troika" Austria, Hungary and Slovakia, which recently likewise started this kin trilateral cooperation . I believe that the listed countries could mai "arc of stability" along the borders of the regions that until recently restless. This will promote the consolidation of the process of pacifi stabilization, reconstruction and reintegration and along with that mak a conductor of integration impulses like the River Danube.

In conclusion, I would like to inform you that yesterday I had the opportunity to present most of these ideas in Davos where this time the gave significant attention to the Balkan region. In my opinion, they a interest. I suggest you bring them to the attention of your Government the one hand, this would be useful in view of further contacts and coop with our partners of Europe and the world. On the other hand, it would useful in relation to the Bulgarian Government's specific initiative th would like to officially announce today, namely, the intention to hold of the Balkan countries' Foreign Ministers in 1996. It should give an to the other two undertakings: infrastructure projects of common inter cooperation between the CEI and BSEC countries.

Bulgaria is calling for a joint formula of lasting efficiency for stabilization, regional security and cooperation. We trust in the poss of a new better future in the Balkans as part of twenty-first century E Bulgaria stands ready to work indefatigably and within the scope of her capability to translate this policy into reality.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/127
23 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 21 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY RESOLUTION 661 (1990) CONCERNING THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith for the attention of the members of the Council the report of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

The report was approved by the Committee on 21 February 1996.

(Signed) Tono EITEL
Chairman
Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait

96-04244 (E) 230296 260296

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Annex

Report of the Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait pursuant to paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines to facilitate full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991)

1. The present report is submitted by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 661 (1990) concerning the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, in accordance with paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines, 1/ for facilitating full international implementation of paragraphs 24, 25 and 27 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991 approved by Security Council resolution 700 (1991) of 17 June 1991.

2. Under paragraph 6, subparagraph (f), of the guidelines, the Committee is required to report at 90-day intervals to the Security Council on the implementation of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq contained in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. The present report is the nineteenth report submitted under the above-mentioned guidelines. The preceding reports were submitted on 13 September 2/ and 10 December 1991, 3/ 12 March, 4/ 11 June, 5/ 8 September 6/ and 4 December 1992, 7/ 19 March, 8/ 7 June, 9/ 7 September 10/ and 14 December 1993, 11/ 4 March, 12/ 6 June, 13/ 2 September 14/ and 29 November 1994 15/ and 1 March, 16/ 30 May, 17/, 25 August 18/ and 27 November 1995. 19/

3. By paragraph 12 of the guidelines, all States are requested to report to the Committee any information that may have come to their attention relating to possible violations of the arms and related sanctions against Iraq committed by other States or foreign nationals. In a letter dated 27 December 1995, Jordan informed the Committee that it had intercepted 115 rocket-guiding devices (gyroscopes) at the Amman Airport, an instance of violation in connection with paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991). These devices were made in the Russian Federation and the middle man was a Gazan businessman called Wi'am Abu Gharebah who had fled to Iraq. As the matter had been dealt with in the Security Council, the Committee took note of this communication at its 133rd meeting, on 7 February 1996.

4. In accordance with paragraphs 13 and 15 of the guidelines, all States and international organizations are required to consult the Committee on the question of whether certain items fall within the provisions of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991), as well as in cases relating to dual-use or multiple-use items, i.e., items meant for civilian use but with potential for diversion or conversion to military use. During the period under review, no States or international organizations have consulted the Committee on these questions.

5. By paragraph 14 of the guidelines, international organizations are requested to provide the Committee with any relevant information that may come to their attention. During the period under review, no information as requested by paragraph 14 of the guidelines has been received by the Committee.

6. The Committee adopted a number of measures aimed at making its procedures more transparent, as recommended by the Security Council in the note of its President dated 29 March 1995. 20/ To that end, the Committee decided, inter alia, to increase the practice of issuing press releases reflecting the most important matters discussed at the meetings. The Committee also decided to make available to any delegation, on a regular basis, lists indicating the status of communications processed under the "no-objection procedure", as well as lists of decisions on other issues considered at Committee meetings. An annual report to the Security Council on its activities would also be prepared by the Committee. The Committee decided further, on 7 February 1996, that its Chairman will, as recommended by the Security Council, give an oral briefing to all interested delegations about the Committee's work after each meeting. The introduction of these measures are expected to further the process of improving the transparency of the Committee's procedures.

7. The Committee will continue its efforts to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it. Since the last report of the Secretary-General, dated 4 December 1991, 21/ no further communications have been received from Member States pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 700 (1991).

Notes

1/ S/22660, annex.

2/ S/23036.

3/ S/23279.

4/ S/23708.

5/ S/24083.

6/ S/24545.

7/ S/24912.

8/ S/25442.

9/ S/25930.

10/ S/26430.

11/ S/26874.

12/ S/1994/274.

13/ S/1994/695.

14/ S/1994/1027.

15/ S/1994/1367.

16/ S/1995/169.

17/ S/1995/442.

18/ S/1995/744.

19/ S/1995/992.

20/ S/1995/234.

21/ S/22884/Add.2.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/128
23 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 22 February 1996 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-04270 (E) 260296 270296

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Annex

Statement by the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 22 February 1996

It is going to be two years since the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proposed the establishment of a new peace mechanism that would replace the outdated armistice system.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea made this proposal in consideration of the failure of the existing armistice system to play any role in stabilizing the situation, preventing arms build-up and obviating the danger of another war on the Korean peninsula, and from its sincere desire to establish a new security arrangement in the post-cold war era and furthermore to achieve peace and security in North-East Asia.

Over the years, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has been consistent and sincere in its efforts to provide conditions for the establishment of a new system for everlasting peace and has repeatedly taken a number of practical steps to this end in the spirit of sincerity and patience. The efforts of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea have elicited the well-deserved support of and responses from the international community.

Despite its direct responsibility for peace on the Korean peninsula, the United States, however, has refused to respond actively to the reasonable proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea even after the signing of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States Agreed Framework, but has remained unchanged in pursuit of its policy of strength and has continued its military threat against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

At present, the United States continues to ship into south Korea a massive quantity of high-tech military hardware and operational equipment and stages war exercises in the sky, on the ground and on the sea almost every day all along the Military Demarcation Line to overpower the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at one stroke.

The United States is becoming more undisguised in its moves to build up a "tripartite military alliance" with Japan and south Korea, and moves forward on a full scale with the reintroduction of its cold war era policy to the Korean peninsula and its vicinity, by repeatedly launching joint military exercises among the United States, south Korea and Japan over the so-called "north Korea's threat".

The south Korean authorities, in support of the United States policy of strangling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, are planning to hold a number of war games on an unprecedented scale one after another throughout 1996 in place of the "Team Spirit" joint military exercises, and have already entered into a substantial stage of actions early this year.

This has further aggravated the tension on the Korean peninsula, which still remains one of the world's hot spots, and there prevails a highly touch-and-go situation, which counts down before another war breaks out.

It is only the patient and peace-loving policy and self-restraint exercised by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that have helped maintain the armistice status and peace on the Korean peninsula even in the current situation.

The United States, which has the real decision-making power on security in south Korea, will, as a matter of course, have to be sober-minded in its judgement of the developments on the Korean peninsula running counter to the contemporary trends towards détente and peace.

It is now obvious to everyone that the 43-year-old armistice system is no longer capable of fulfilling its mission of maintaining security on the Korean peninsula.

As a matter of fact, the obsolete armistice system has never contributed to peace on the Korean peninsula ever since its entry into effect, and it has only served as evidence of the hostile relations that have existed between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on one hand and the United States and the United Nations on the other.

Moreover, since the unilateral steps taken by the United States have paralysed the functions of the Military Armistice Commission, the only supervisory body monitoring the implementation of the armistice agreement, the current vacuum threatening the security on the Korean peninsula will have to be filled as soon as possible.

It is an indisputable reality indeed that none other than the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States are in a position to resolve all the issues related to the peace and security on the Korean peninsula, including those related to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States agreements on the resolution of the nuclear issue.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States, being the signatories to the Korean Armistice Agreement, bear a noble responsibility for preventing the recurrence of war on the Korean peninsula and establishing peace and security throughout the Asian-Pacific region.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea remains consistent in its calls for the United States to conclude a peace agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a mechanism for a full, comprehensive and everlasting peace on the Korean peninsula.

However, in consideration of the Korea policy of the United States and the current status of Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States relations, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea deems that at least an institutional mechanism should be in place as a matter of urgency to prevent the outbreak of any armed conflict and war on the Korean peninsula. In this context, the

Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea offers the following expanded proposal aimed at establishing a new peace mechanism.

First, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States should sign an interim agreement in order to eliminate possible armed conflict and danger of war and to preserve the state of armistice peacefully.

The interim agreement may include issues concerning the management of the Military Demarcation Line and the Demilitarized Zone, ways of addressing the cases of armed conflict and accidents, the composition, duties and terms of reference of a joint military body, and other issues related to the maintenance of the security and order. The interim agreement shall take the place of the armistice agreement until the conclusion of a full peace agreement.

Second, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States should form and operate a Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States joint military body in Panmunjom for the implementation and supervision of the interim agreement, replacing the Military Armistice Commission.

Third, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States should hold negotiations at an appropriate level on the signing of the interim agreement and establishment of the proposed Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States joint military body.

Now that north and south Korea have already signed an agreement on non-aggression and inaugurated the north-south joint military body, this detailed proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, if realized, would bring about an epoch-making environment for détente and peace on the Korean peninsula and would also create the prerequisite for a confederal reunification of Korea.

The proposal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a reasonable initiative that fully meets the interests of the signatories of the Korean Armistice Agreement and of all other countries concerned.

The United States will have to respond positively to this proposal reflecting the broad-mindedness and the peace-loving position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

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S/1996/129
23 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TURKMENISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of the Government of Turkmenistan, as the host country of the continued inter-Tajik negotiations on national reconciliation, I have the honour to request you to bring to the attention of the members of the Security Council the text of the Ashkhabat Declaration adopted at the second phase of the negotiations (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Aksoltan ATAEVA
Permanent Representative

96-04276 (E) 230296 230296 260296

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Annex

[Original: Russian]

Ashgabat
18 February 1996

ASHGABAT DECLARATION

on the results of the second phase of inter-Tajik talks under United Nations auspices on national reconciliation

The second phase of the ongoing inter-Tajik talks under the auspices of the United Nations on national reconciliation took place in Ashgabat from 26 January to 19 February 1996. The delegation of the Republic of Tajikistan was headed by Mr. Talbak Nazarov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Tajikistan, while the delegation of the United Tajik Opposition (UTU) was headed by Mr. Haji Akbar Turajonzodah, first deputy chairman of the Islamic Revival Movement of Tajikistan. Mediation services in the course of the talks were provided by Ambassador Ramiro Piriz-Ballón, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The talks were attended by observers from the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The delegations of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and UTU discussed frankly and in depth the political problems identified in the Protocol on the fundamental principles for establishing peace and national accord in Tajikistan, of 17 August 1995, and the proposals by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The talks on these issues will be continued.

The delegation of the Republic of Tajikistan put forward an initiative for the holding of a special session of the Majlis-i Olli (Parliament) with the participation of the UTU leadership, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and representatives of the States and international organizations acting as observers at the inter-Tajik talks. The Government of the Republic of Tajikistan gave the United Nations an undertaking that it would fully guarantee the security of the UTU delegation, and also to extend to it the necessary immunities and privileges during the period of its stay in the Republic. The invitation to the UTU delegation was sent by the United Nations Observer Mission in Tajikistan. The special session will be convened three weeks after the conclusion of the second phase of the Ashgabat talks and will be fully publicized on the same day over radio and television and in the other mass media.

In the course of a review of the political problems, the parties discussed issues relating to the convening of a consultative forum of the peoples of Tajikistan, and prepared a text of an agreement on the subject which remains open for signature after agreement has been reached on the issue of when it will be held - before or after the signature of the General Agreement on Peace and

National Accord. In the course of the discussion of this group of problems, the issue of the establishment of a National Reconciliation Council was also discussed, but because of disagreements of principle no agreement was reached.

In the course of the talks, the parties expressed readiness to extend the validity of the Agreement on a Temporary Cease-fire and the Cessation of Other Hostile Acts on the Tajik-Afghan Border and within the Country. However, in the light of conceptual differences in the approaches to the issues associated with its implementation, no positive solution was found, and the parties agreed to continue talks on the subject.

The parties agreed to renew talks in Ashgabat at a time to be determined by the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The delegations of the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and UTU, and also the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, express their deep appreciation to President S. Niyazov and the Government of Turkmenistan for their warm hospitality, the excellent conditions created for the conduct of the talks and the constant support forthcoming during them.

The parties and the Special Envoy express gratitude to the representatives of the Observer States and OSCE for their help and cooperation in the course of the talks.

The delegations of the Republic of Tajikistan and UTU express their sincere appreciation to the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for his efforts to achieve progress in the talks.

(Signed) T. Nazarov
Head of the delegation of the
Republic of Tajikistan

(Signed) A. Turajonzodah
Head of the delegation of the
United Tajik Opposition

(Signed) R. Piriz-Ballón
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations

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S/1996/130
26 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions of my Government and in view of the seriousness of the situation created by the shooting down of two civil aircraft by Cuban forces, I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider this important matter.

(Signed) Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT

96-04403 (E) 260296 270296

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S/1996/131
26 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communications, both dated 26 February 1996, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I would appreciate your bringing them to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

96-04330 (E) 260296 270296

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Annex I

Letter dated 26 February 1996 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with the provisions of United Nations Security Council resolution 1031 (1995), I have pleasure in transmitting to you the third report on the operation of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I wish to assure you that the North Atlantic Council remains committed to playing its full part in securing a lasting and durable peace. I myself visited Mostar on 12 February 1996 and publicly expressed my support for the European Union's Administrator. I have also remained in close personal contact with the High Representative, Mr. Carl Bildt, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter. IFOR's mission continues in close cooperation with him.

It is also essential for IFOR to be able to conduct a full dialogue with the parties. I welcome the undertakings given in this regard at the Rome summit last week, and the fact that the Bosnian Serbs have now re-established dialogue with IFOR at all military levels.

I am writing to you separately with respect to paragraph 2 of United Nations Security Council resolution 1022 (1995).

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

Appendix

Third report to the United Nations Security Council on IFOR operations

The present report covers the period between the last report (S/1996/49, annex), dated 23 January 1996, and 22 February 1996.

Deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR)

1. IFOR is now firmly established and fully capable of executing its tasks under the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. With the deployment of all forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) by 18 February, the three Multinational Divisions (MND) are well established in their respective areas of responsibility. This will be further consolidated as further forces from the non-NATO contributors transfer under IFOR control. IFOR forces continue to monitor compliance with the military aspects of the Peace Agreement by means which include marking the inter-entity boundary line (IEBL), patrolling in the zone of separation (ZOS) along the agreed cease-fire line (ACFL) and in the areas of transfer (AOT), and monitoring mine clearance in those areas.

2. IFOR air assets have supported the safe movement of forces into theatre. These air assets will continue to provide a robust capability to secure the air space, defend and support IFOR ground forces and monitor compliance. The maritime assets currently deployed both in support of IFOR and for Operation Sharp Guard also continue to provide surveillance, a presence to seaward of the coast and, embarked, the theatre reserve. In addition, maritime mine clearance assets provide a continuous survey of the routes leading to ports used by IFOR and have successfully cleared a number of obsolete mines from the First and Second World Wars.

3. The media coverage of IFOR operations remains extensive and generally supportive. The locally produced IFOR newspaper, Herald of Peace, is now on its sixth edition and IFOR radio broadcasts from four IFOR transmitters. There has also been a concerted effort to distribute handbills and posters to explain the terms of the peace agreement and to expand mine safety and awareness.

4. The deployment of IFOR has been greatly facilitated by the excellent cooperation of the United Nations Peace Forces during the period of transition following the termination of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mandate.

Participation by non-NATO countries

5. Since the last report, Austria, the Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Malaysia, Poland and Ukraine have joined Sweden in transferring their forces under IFOR control and the Russian force has deployed with MND (North) under separate command arrangements. Jordan and Morocco have been formally invited to contribute forces, and discussions continue with Albania, Bangladesh and Bulgaria.

Risk assessment

6. The direct risks to IFOR troops remain those of rogue or extremist elements and the continued, albeit reducing, risk posed by residual foreign forces. Occasional sniping and shooting incidents have also continued and are assessed as coming mainly from disaffected elements of the parties. IFOR continues to adopt self-protective measures for the security of its personnel.

7. Apart from these direct risks, the very large number of mines that are scattered throughout Bosnia pose the most significant danger to IFOR personnel and others. A number of incidents have already caused casualties to IFOR and local people and, notwithstanding the efforts of the parties to mark and clear the minefields, the problem remains very great. The inaccuracy of the information on known minefields, the quantity of mines, poor weather and the lack of proper mine marking and clearing equipment has significantly impaired the parties' ability to comply on this issue.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

8. The latest deadline in the Peace Agreement, D+45, has passed. In summary, the current IFOR compliance assessment is as follows:

- The general cease-fire continues to hold and the parties remain generally in compliance with the Cessation of Hostilities. The incidents of sniper firing have diminished, although the risk remains.

- As required by the Peace Agreement, by D+45 the parties had withdrawn their forces from the AOT.

- On 16 February a number of undeclared anti-aircraft guns were confiscated within the ACFL ZOS of the MND (North) area of responsibility. IFOR has since determined that all heavy weapons have been declared or removed from within 10 kilometres of the ACFL ZOS. On occasions, IFOR was denied access to weapon storage sites, but subsequently was allowed access. While overall compliance is good, we are concerned about these apparent attempts to test IFOR's resolve.

- Although there have been positive indications of the voluntary removal of foreign forces, some remain. Cooperation with the civil authorities to expedite this requirement is continuing. It is however considered that full compliance has yet to be achieved. On 15 February, IFOR detained 11 persons and significant quantities of arms, explosives and bomb manufacturing equipment. Three of these detainees were foreign nationals but, as one carried diplomatic status he was released immediately. The remaining 10 were handed over to the Bosnian Ministry of the Interior and the 2 other foreign nationals have since been released. It has since been reported that all three foreign nationals have left the country.

- All parties appear still to be holding prisoners of war (POWs). It is to be hoped that continued political pressure will be brought to bear on the parties to ensure compliance with the provisions of the Peace Agreement on the release of POWs.

- Restrictions on the freedom of movement for refugees and displaced persons are occurring more frequently and include civilian police checkpoints, some of which appear to have been extorting money for right of passage. Although IFOR monitors and reports on such incidents, the relevant civil authorities should impose their control over these restrictions as soon as possible.

- IFOR's freedom of movement has also been impaired on occasions in the pursuance of their monitoring functions. This has resulted in a number of dangerous stand-off incidents. It has been made clear that restrictions on IFOR's freedom of movement will not be tolerated.

- There is mounting concern over the apparent re-badging of military personnel as police and their deployment into contentious areas. IFOR intends to continue monitoring this.

9. The Joint Military Commission (JMC) has continued to develop its role of providing a regular, joint and transparent forum for resolving disputes and building confidence. These meetings between the parties and IFOR commanders have focused on sniping by disaffected elements, weapons holdings and storage, prisoner exchange, freedom of movement and ZOS withdrawal plans, as well as the transitional situation in Sarajevo and Mostar, which remains of serious concern.

10. IFOR will continue to execute its mission in an evenhanded manner. Cooperation with Bosnian Serb authorities was, however, set back following the detention by the Bosnian Government of suspected Bosnian Serb war criminals at the beginning of February. This resulted in a curtailment of Bosnian Serb cooperation with IFOR, including participation in JMC. This issue was addressed with the Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) during the summit meeting in Rome on 17 and 18 February.

Cooperation with international organizations and the High Representative

11. IFOR continues to cooperate closely with the High Representative and there is IFOR representation on most of the joint civil commissions. Close cooperation has also been established, both through direct contacts and the civil/military cooperation process, with international organizations including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Police Task Force (IPTF). IFOR will continue to assist the High Representative and the international organizations as far as its principal tasks, as defined in the Peace Agreement, and available resources allow. In particular, the establishment of IPTF is critical to the process of stability and IFOR therefore hopes that the full complement of police officers required by IPTF will be deployed shortly.

12. IFOR continues to support the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to bring persons indicted by the Tribunal to justice. The Tribunal has expressed its satisfaction with the assistance received from IFOR. Practical arrangements are in hand with the Tribunal concerning the arrangements for IFOR to detain any persons indicted by the Tribunal who come into contact with IFOR in its execution of assigned tasks in order to assure the transfer of these persons to the Tribunal. The Prosecutor of the Tribunal, Justice Goldstone, has met the NATO Secretary-General and the NATO Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) to review this and to discuss logistic support to the Tribunal. Concerning the latter, IFOR will support the discharge of the Tribunal's mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina to the extent of its capabilities, taking account of its assigned tasks and resources. IFOR has also undertaken to carry out air reconnaissance of suspected mass grave sites and to report all suspicious activities detected near such sites by IFOR patrols carrying out their duty. IFOR responded positively to a Tribunal request to assist in the secure transfer of two individuals from Sarajevo to the Hague on 12 February for further investigation by the Tribunal.

Annex II

Letter dated 26 February 1996 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to my letters of 23 January (S/1996/49) and 6 February 1996 (S/1996/87), I am writing with respect to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1022 (1995).

I am now able to report to you the assessment of the Commander of the Implementation Force that Bosnian Serb forces have withdrawn from the zones of separation established in the Peace Agreement.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

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S/1996/132
26 February 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 23 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ZAIRE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, for the attention of the members of the Security Council, Zaire's position on the interim report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate reports of the sale or supply of arms to former Rwandan government forces (S/1996/67, annex).

I am also authorized to tell you that, since the International Commission of Inquiry left Zaire of its own accord, it is for it to decide, and to inform the Zairian authorities accordingly, what it considers to be an appropriate moment for it to return to Zaire to complete its work there. It will receive the same cooperation and the same facilities from the Government of Zaire as it did on its first visit to the country.

I should be grateful if you would bring the content of this letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council and arrange for them to be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) LUKABU KHABOUJI N'ZAJI
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

96-04511 (E) 270296 270296 280296

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Annex

Zaire's position on the interim report of the International Commission of Inquiry, as set forth by the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Affairs, of Zaire on 22 February 1996

1. By his letter No. PM/01/MNT/0-03/95 of 23 June 1995, the Prime Minister and Head of Government requested the establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry into the unproved allegations of the supply by Zaire of arms or training to former Rwandan government forces. As a result, he can hardly oppose or obstruct the Commission's work, even if the Commission's establishment has been vitiated by many irregularities. Resolution 1013 (1995) of 17 September 1995 was adopted by the Security Council three months after the formal request by the Zairian Government and two weeks after the adoption, on 16 August 1995, by the same Security Council, of resolution 1011 (1995) lifting the embargo on the supply of arms to Rwanda and making it possible for Rwanda to arm itself against the alleged threats coming from Zaire.

2. Zaire welcomed the International Commission of Inquiry to its territory and is the only country in the region to have answered the Commission's entire list of questions.

3. Nothing in the interim report proves that Zaire is training former Rwandan government forces in order to destabilize Rwanda and is supplying them with arms for that purpose. In fact, if Zaire had wanted to do this, it would have been permissible for it to return to those forces all the arms seized from them. Moreover, the inquiry conducted among officials of the British Overseas Development Administration and information obtained from members of the International Commission clear Zaire of all suspicion.

4. Zaire categorically denies that it is involved in any attempt to destabilize Rwanda through former Rwandan government forces.

5. Zaire regrets that, having found no evidence with which to incriminate it, the International Commission of Inquiry, in its interim report, uses turns of phrase and circumlocutions designed to leave an element of doubt, giving reason to believe that the Commission came to Zaire with preconceived ideas.

6. What is more, the Commission showed no respect or consideration for the Zairian authorities in North and South Kivu. It did not even deign to accord to them, during its mission, the same treatment as that accorded to Rwanda's leaders. In Rwanda, the Commission was assisted in its inquiries by several officers of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (APR) who accompanied it everywhere, including during the inquiry on Iwawa island where they even served as interpreters. In Zaire, on the other hand, the Commission would not allow the delegation, headed by the Auditor General of the Zairian Armed Forces, which was escorting it to attend meetings where it questioned witnesses. Why?

7. Zaire did not terminate the Commission's mandate, nor did it ask it to leave its territory. Rather, the Commission did so of its own accord as soon as

the Zairian Government raised the issue of unequal treatment and pointed out that the conduct of some Commission members was incompatible with the objectivity and impartiality required for the performance of such a mission.

8. Zaire therefore rejects the accusation of lack of cooperation levelled at it by the Commission and is outraged that the Commission's members have said that it obstructed their inquiry. What Zaire wants is to see a return to stability in the Great Lakes region, a stability that has been threatened by those who are the cause of the refugee exodus.

9. Zaire is the victim, but not the cause, of the refugee exodus and the United Nations should therefore look into the causes of that exodus, which has been taking place since 1959, and concentrate on what is happening inside Rwanda instead of diverting the international community's attention to Zaire.

10. Zaire strongly reiterates that it is not harbouring "criminals" from Rwanda. It is Rwandans fleeing the horrors of the civil war in their country that are coming to live in Zaire. Zaire asks only one thing: that they leave.

11. Zaire completely rejects the content of the letter dated 2 February 1996 from the Ambassador of Rwanda addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1996/84). That letter is a tissue of lies and nonsense, if one bears in mind that the Ambassador, in order to get where he is today, benefited, like the other refugees who fled Rwanda, from asylum and protection in Zaire.

12. One is entitled to wonder how much credence can be given to statements by the Ambassador of a country which, after demanding and obtaining the establishment of an International Tribunal to try persons accused of genocide, itself establishes popular courts to try the same persons, at the very moment when the Tribunal is in session. What confidence can one have in the sentences passed by a judicial system that is monopolized by a single ethnic group, totally unreliable and forces over 60,000 people to languish in inhuman conditions in makeshift prisons? What can one say of a judicial system that has been turned over to a single ethnic group, the Tutsis, to try Hutu "criminals"?

13. If the Commission had wanted to be objective, it could have indicated in its interim report that several Rwandan citizens of Tutsi origin have been arrested by Zaire's security forces for having planted bombs and organized arms caches in North and South Kivu.

14. Zaire is entitled to think that all of this forms part of an international political conspiracy that was intended to steer the International Commission of Inquiry towards arms caches created for the needs of the cause by persons infiltrated by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (FPR) in North and South Kivu, so as to justify the false allegations levelled at Zaire and to cover up Rwanda's clandestine activities to destabilize the Great Lakes region. Unfortunately for those who thought up this plan, the network of people engaged in laying mines and planting bombs was dismantled and the arms caches discovered before the arrival of the International Commission of Inquiry, when an attempt was made on the life of the FAZ Chief of Staff at Goma.

15. Lastly, Zaire did not ask the Commission to leave and did not terminate its mandate. Instead, in keeping with the above-mentioned letter from its Prime Minister and Head of Government, Zaire is asking that the terms of reference of the International Commission of Inquiry be made very clear and be negotiated with the Government of Zaire and that the Commission accord non-discriminatory treatment to Zaire. The least that Zaire is entitled to expect from the members of a United Nations commission is that they show respect and above all consideration, at every level, for the authorities of the country they visit. The Government of Zaire considers it an outrage on the part of the International Commission of Inquiry that it invited to Goma Rwandan elements who had been expelled from Zaire, or had fled after judicial proceedings were instituted against them, in order to provide them with information on Zaire.

(Signed) Gérard KAMANDA wa KAMANDA
Deputy Prime Minister
Minister for Foreign Affairs

UNITED
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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/882
S/1996/133
26 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 15 (c)
ELECTIONS TO FILL VACANCIES IN PRINCIPAL ORGANS: ELECTION OF A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

List of candidates nominated by national groups

Note by the Secretary-General

1. By a letter dated 20 November 1995 addressed to States parties to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Secretary-General drew attention to the vacancy in the International Court of Justice caused by the death of Judge Andrés Aguilar Mawdsley (Venezuela) on 24 October 1995. In the same communication, the Secretary-General, in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court, invited the national groups of States parties to the Statute to undertake the nomination of persons in a position to accept the duties of a member of the Court. The Secretary-General further requested that nominations should be received no later than 2 February 1996. Those nominations thus received have appeared in document A/50/866/-S/1996/52 and Add.1.

2. The Secretary-General received the following nomination by a national group after 2 February 1996:

Name and nationality	Nominated by the national group of
Parra-Aranguren, Gonzalo (Venezuela)	Belgium (7 February 1996: date of receipt)

96-04338 (E) 260296 270296

UNITED
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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/134
26 February 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 20 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MEXICO TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, and in response to communication SCA/10/96 (1), I am hereby informing you of the measures instituted by Mexico to comply with the sanctions imposed on the Government of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by the Security Council through its resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993).

Since April 1992 the relevant offices of the Government of Mexico and the consulates of Mexico have been complying with the provisions concerning the sanctions imposed by the Security Council in its resolution 748 (1992). In addition, on 27 June 1994, an Agreement by the Ministry of Trade and Industry was published in the Federation's Official Gazette, entering into force on 28 June 1994 and prohibiting the export to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of the items listed in the annex to Security Council resolution 883 (1993) and the provision of equipment or supplies and grants of licensing arrangements for the manufacture or maintenance of such items. The provisions of the said Agreement remain in force. Thus, the Government of Mexico has fully complied with Council resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 (1993).

(Signed) Manuel TELLO
Permanent Representative of Mexico
to the United Nations

96-04344 (E) 260296 260296 270296

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/51/70
S/1996/135
26 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fifty-first session
MEASURES TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 26 February 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Two grave acts of terrorism were perpetrated by Palestinian extremists yesterday in Israel.

On Sunday morning, at 6.48 a.m. local time, a Hamas terrorist detonated a bomb on a commuter bus travelling in rush-hour traffic in downtown Jerusalem. According to the most recent accounts, the explosion killed 24 Israelis and injured an additional 51.

Fifty minutes later, at approximately 7.30 a.m. local time, another terrorist with a bomb strapped to his body walked into a crowd of Israelis and blew himself up in the town of Ashkelon. One Israeli was killed as a result of this act of terror and 36 were wounded, 7 of them critically.

Sources from the military wing of the fundamentalist organization Hamas have claimed responsibility for the two suicide bombings.

These terrorist acts occurred one day after Israel lifted its closure of the Gaza Strip and West Bank, in response to appeals from the Palestinian Authority as well as from sources from the international community.

Recently, the redeployment of the Israel Defence Forces from six Palestinian cities in the West Bank and the holding of elections for the Palestinian Council throughout the territories were completed. These achievements were reached within the framework of the Declaration of Principles signed by Israel and the PLO on 13 September 1993. The crimes were intended not only to kill Israelis, but to derail the peace process as well. The attackers and those who sent them are enemies of peace and of the people of the Middle East who seek a better future - Arab and Jew alike.

Israel will not allow terrorism to upset the progress made thus far in implementing the Declaration of Principles. Israel remains committed to working with the Palestinians towards achieving peace. At the same time, Israel will take all measures necessary to combat terrorism and ensure the security of its citizens.

Israel has demanded that the Palestinian Authority take more active measures to intensify its war against terrorism, particularly against terrorism emanating from the Palestinian self-rule areas.

Israel calls upon all Member States to join those who have already unequivocally condemned this crime and to support the peace process and the battle against terrorism.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under the item entitled "Measures to eliminate international terrorism", and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gad YAACOBI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Israel
to the United Nations

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/136
29 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Argentina, Canada, Chile, France, Honduras, United States of America and Venezuela: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling the provisions of its resolutions 841 (1993) of 16 June 1993, 861 (1993) of 27 August 1993, 862 (1993) of 31 August 1993, 867 (1993) of 23 September 1993, 873 (1993) of 13 October 1993, 875 (1993) of 16 October 1993, 905 (1994) of 23 March 1994, 917 (1994) of 6 May 1994, 933 (1994) of 30 June 1994, 940 (1994) of 31 July 1994, 944 (1994) of 29 September 1994, 948 (1994) of 15 October 1994, 975 (1995) of 7 February 1995 and 1007 (1995) of 31 July 1995,

Recalling also the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on Haiti,

Recalling also the terms of the Governors Island Agreement (S/26063) and the related Pact of New York (S/26297),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 14 February 1996 (S/1996/112) and noting the recommendations contained therein,

Taking note of the letters of 9 February 1996 from the President of the Republic of Haiti to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (S/1996/99 and A/50/861/Add.1),

Underlining the importance of the peaceful transfer of power to the new democratically elected President of Haiti,

Welcoming and supporting the efforts of the Organization of American States to promote in cooperation with the United Nations consolidation of peace and democracy in Haiti,

Stressing the need to ensure that the Government of Haiti will be able to maintain the secure and stable environment established by the Multinational Force in Haiti (MNF) and maintained with the assistance of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), and in this context welcoming progress to establish a fully functioning Haitian National Police and to revitalize Haiti's system of justice,

Recognizing the link between peace and development and that a sustained commitment by the international community to assist and support the economic, social and institutional development of Haiti is indispensable for long-term peace and stability in the country,

Commending the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, the contribution of UNMIH and the International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) in support of the Haitian people's quest for stability, national reconciliation, lasting democracy, constitutional order and economic prosperity,

Acknowledging the contribution of the international financial institutions, including the Inter-American Development Bank, and the importance of their continued involvement in the development of Haiti,

Recognizing that the people of Haiti bear the ultimate responsibility for national reconciliation, the maintenance of a secure and stable environment and reconstruction of their country,

1. Welcomes the democratic election of a new President in Haiti and the peaceful transfer of power from one democratically elected President to another on 7 February 1996;

2. Expresses appreciation to all Member States which have contributed to UNMIH;

3. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 14 February 1996 and notes his recommendations for continued United Nations assistance to the democratically elected Government of Haiti;

4. Reaffirms the importance of a professional, self-sustaining, fully functioning national police force of adequate size and structure to the consolidation of peace, stability and democracy and revitalization of Haiti's system of justice;

5. Decides, in accordance with the recommendations of the Secretary-General's report of 14 February 1996, that for the purpose of assisting the democratic Government of Haiti in fulfilling its responsibilities to (a) sustain by UNMIH's presence the secure and stable environment which has been established, and (b) professionalize the Haitian National Police, the mandate of UNMIH is extended for the final period of four months, for the purposes set out in paragraphs 47, 48 and 49 of the report;

6. Decides to decrease the troop level of UNMIH to no more than 1,200;

7. Decides to reduce the current level of civilian police personnel to no more than 300;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to consider and implement, as appropriate, steps for further reduction of the strength of UNMIH consistent with the implementation of this mandate;

9. Requests further the Secretary-General to initiate planning not later than 1 June 1996 for the complete withdrawal of UNMIH;

10. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of this resolution by 15 June 1996 including information on activities by the United Nations system as a whole to promote the development of Haiti;

11. Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken by the United Nations and by Member States pursuant to this and other relevant resolutions in order to carry out the provisions of the mandate as set out in paragraph 5 above;

12. Reiterates the commitment of the international community and international financial institutions to assist and support the economic, social and institutional development of Haiti and stresses its importance for sustaining a secure and stable environment in Haiti;

13. Appeals to Member States to make voluntary contributions to the trust fund established in resolution 975 (1995) for the support of the Haitian National Police, to ensure that the police are adequately trained and fully operational, which is essential for the implementation of the mandate;

14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.